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tate legislative sessions often feature intense debates
over appropriations bills. Both legislatures and gov-
ernors have their own weapons in these battles. One
of the most well known is the ability many governors have
to veto specific line items in a bill. The line-item veto is
often assumed to be an effective way of keeping spending
under control. But whether the conventional wisdom is
correct on this is still an open question. In fact, the line-
item veto is a tool that isn’t always used in the context we
might expect — and the results can be surprising.
Forty-four of America’s 50 governors have some form of
the line-item veto, according to the National Conference of
State Legislatures. Six states do not have any form of the
line-item veto, including North Carolina. Governors in
those states can only veto entire legislation, not portions 
of it. 
In the states where it exists, the line-item veto functions
differently and can shift the balance of power in budget
debates. Governors who have the line-item veto can elimi-
nate portions of bills. In some cases, they can adjust
spending amounts, and in others, governors can amend 
legislative language. Governors can use the line-item veto to
preserve their budget preferences sometimes, but legislators
can combat the use of the line-item veto by bundling expens-
es the governor doesn’t want with those the governor does
want. Yet line-item vetoes, if comprehensive enough, can
provide a way for governors to possibly thwart those efforts. 
To determine whether this sort of veto can be an effective
way of imposing spending discipline requires making a few
assumptions. The first is that politicians, like anyone in any
profession, face incentives. Governors aren’t necessarily less
prone to them than are legislators. The line-item veto may
not be anything more than an additional bargaining chip 
that a governor can use to go after additional spending he
might want, says Samuel Baker, a former economist at the
College of William & Mary.  
The second assumption is that the political climate
affects how the veto power is used. The line-item veto, to
some extent, shifts power to the executive branch. But, as
we’ll see, that may not matter much. If it does, there are
some important contexts in which we can expect the veto to
be exercised more frequently. 
Line-Item Veto and Divided Government 
Political contexts usually influence usage of line-item vetoes.
They are used more often when opposing parties control 
the executive and legislative branches and the legislature
cannot override the veto, argues Douglas Holtz-Eakin, an
economist who formerly taught at Syracuse University
before working at the Council of Economic Advisers during
the George W. Bush administration and then heading up the
Congressional Budget Office. Holtz-Eakin is now president
of a consulting firm in Washington, D.C.
Highly partisan environments are most conducive to use
of the line-item veto, says Glenn Abney, a former Georgia
State University political scientist. “The governors will often
use the veto because they disagree over policy,” he notes.
Conversely, when one party controls both the executive and
legislative branches, the partisan temperature is lower. 
In those situations, the item veto is less likely to be used,
Abney and University of Georgia political scientist Thomas
Lauth argue in a 1985 paper. 
While the line-item veto shifts some power to the execu-
tive branch, governors may have good reasons not to
exercise this power. For example, a governor may decline to
use the veto to avoid further antagonizing lawmakers, espe-
cially if relationships with the legislature have soured, in
order to preserve remaining political capital. Those relation-
ships can be crucial. Stable political relationships between
elected officials and the state bureaucracy can be crucial and
can determine state expenditure levels, economists James
Dearden of Lehigh University and Thomas Husted of
American University write in a 1993 paper. 
The scope of line-item veto powers may determine how
useful they are to governors. Only 15 of the 44 governors
with line-item vetoes can adjust both dollar amounts and
statutory language in legislation. When they can amend dol-
lar amounts and language, governors are most likely to use
the veto. In their paper, Dearden and Husted argue that a
governor’s ability to obtain a desired budget outcome
increases with the comprehensiveness of the line-item veto
authority. 
Line-item vetoes don’t render legislators powerless, 
however: They can write bills in ways that make it difficult
for a governor to veto them. Lawmakers also have a bargain-
ing chip of their own: the override. But research shows that
line-item vetoes are rarely overridden. Several explanations
for the upholding of vetoes are possible, argue Abney and
Lauth. For one, super-majorities are often required for an
override, which can be hard to achieve. When overrides are
difficult, the veto power is more meaningful.
Fiscal Effects of the Line-Item Veto
The veto is not always used to strike dollar amounts. In a
nationwide study published in 2002, Abney and Lauth
review appropriations bills from line-item veto states from
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the years 1993 and 1995. Governors in
only 18 states used the veto in 1993,
while 22 used it in 1995. In both years,
the researchers show more than 60
percent of vetoes cut language about
appropriations that did not contain
dollar amounts. More than 20 per-
cent of vetoes were of language
totally unrelated to appropriations.
Vetoes of legislative language can 
still have fiscal effects, although 
it is difficult to assign them a dollar 
value. Language and appropriations 
in bills are not always related. Elimi-
nating language requiring certain 
state agencies to maintain specific
staffing levels could lead to job 
cuts and resulting cost savings, for
example.
Yet leaving the agency free to
eliminate jobs may not necessarily
lead to job cuts if they find savings
elsewhere in their budget, so it’s hard to prove that the 
line-item veto would have a direct fiscal effect in such a 
case. In a research project about the line-item veto in
Georgia, Lauth and Catherine Reese of Arkansas State
University-Jonesboro find that 79 percent of the 209 line-
item vetoes used between 1975 and 2002 eliminated language
that had a fiscal impact that was hard to measure in dollars. 
The threat of the veto can play an important role in 
legislative debates. Reese and Lauth’s Georgia study covers
several decades. They conducted interviews of the state’s
seven governors prior to Sonny Perdue, its current execu-
tive. The governors told Reese and Lauth the threat of the
line-item veto was an important element of their power.
Indeed, infrequent use of the veto
may mean that its mere threat has
made actual usage unnecessary,
although it’s hard to be certain, Reese
and Lauth say. 
Such evidence should be qualified.
Budget officers overwhelmingly say 
that a constitutional balanced budget
requirement is the most important 
factor in promoting fiscal responsi-
bility, Lauth claims in a 1996 paper. Both
executive and legislative budget officials
were surveyed, and at least 90 percent of
each group cited the balanced budget
requirement’s importance. 
To resolve this dispute, then,
requires turning to the empirical evi-
dence. The most comprehensive
analysis to date is still the Holtz-
Eakin study. Looking there, you
discover that evidence of whether 
the overall level of spending actually
goes down because of the line-item veto is hard to find. 
In his paper, Holtz-Eakin concludes that the line-item 
veto may influence the spending level only over the short
run — particularly in regard to reducing a current budget
deficit — in cases where a governor’s political party does not
hold a majority in the legislature. Over time, however, there
is no statistically significant effect on the size of the budget
in the long run. Instead, it seems that the line-item veto 
simply alters the composition of spending.
So as voters watch their legislature haggle over the 
budget each year, they should keep in mind the admonition
Holtz-Eakin includes in his study: “There are no simple
truths concerning the impact of the line-item veto.”  RF
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Executive Privilege
Not all governors can use the line-item veto
the same way. Whether the veto can be
used to eliminate budget items or 
legislative language depends on where 
you are in the Fifth District. 
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